Jacob Christensen

Back in the good old days, the Netherlands used to be a model case of a working multi-party system where – due to the social segmentation – the political elites were able to construct institutions for political and cultural cohabitation. It was easy to predict that the Dutch Prime Minister would come from one of the three major confessional parties – usually the Catholic KVP as the Catholics actually were the largest single religious group¹ – in shifting coalitions with the Social Democratic PvdA or the liberal VVD.

But the stable world of the 1950s and 1960s is long gone and since at least the early 1990s the Netherlands have been a bit of a political experiment. In 1994 Social Democrat Win Kok formed the first government without any confessional party (the “purple” coalitions between PvdA, VVD and social-liberal D66) and while Kok was the talk of the town (and the OECD) in the late 1990s, his political career came to a dramatic end in the 2002 general election which coincided with the publication of a report about the role played by Dutch UN troops in the 1995 Srebenica massacre. By then the purple coalition was effectively dead and the CDA and – ominously – the anti-immigration Lijst Pim Fortuyn were the big winners of the election. To add to the mess, Fortuyn was murdered just before the election – not by an Islamist militant as you might have expected but by an animal rights activist.

The new CDA leader Jan Peter Balkenende showed himself as a master of brinkmanship, seized the initiative and entered a coalition with VVD and LPF. Sure, the coalition came apart even faster than it had been formed (which may not say too much in the case of Dutch government formations) but after a snap (again in Dutch terms) election in 2003, Balkenende was able to continue in office, first with the D66 and later with the PvdA as the third partner, but his cabinets had a nasty habit of breaking up in mid-term.² In 2006, D66 left following a controversy about immigration minister Rita Verdonk’s handling of the Ayaan Hirsi Ali case (which again was linked to the second political murder in the Netherlands in the 2000s – that of director Theo van Gogh).

Finally, Balkenende’s latest cabinet was brought down by disagreements over Dutch participation in the Afghanistan mission. Afghanistan, curiously, did not play a role in the election campaign – perhaps because PvdA leader Wouter Bos had thrown in the towel following the break-up of the coalition and had been replaced by Job Cohen – and despite the presence of Geert “Mozart” Wilders and his anti-immigration PVV – immigration and integration issues were not particularly emphasised.

Still, the 2010 election somehow reminds of the 2002 election: The major governing party (2002: PvdA, 2010: CDA) suffered a massive defeat, a populist anti-immigration party (2002: LPF, 2010: PVV) noted a massive win and the rest of the party system has been blown to smithereens. That Balkenende announced his resignation from active politics on the night of the election came a no surprise, but VVD leader Mark Rutte as the most likely next prime minister is facing the mother of all government formation crises.

Theoretically, a VVD-PVV-CDA coalition would command a majority in the Second Chamber but as PVV has not participated in regional elections, such a coalition would be short of a majority in the First Chamber. This leaves us with a number of complicated four- or five-party coalitions ranging from the liberal VVD to the socialist GL and SP.³ Despite Rutte’s call for fast negotiations, the likely prospect is that of the Netherlands being without a regular government for most of 2010.

Update: A cool map of the Netherlands where you can check the variations in the individual parties’ share of the vote. HT: Political Quirks.

PS: The executive summary of Dutch party politics is here.

1. In case I hear you scream “WHAT?!? Aren’t the Dutch protestants???”, then remember that the protestants were and are divided confessionally and organisationally [↩]
2. Balkendende IV also included a small Christian party, the CU. [↩]
3. A VVD-PvdA-SP coalition is theoretically possible but not particularly likely [↩]

Some aspects of the present government crisis in the Netherlands are very fascinating to follow for a Scandinavian. The Dutch party system is somewhat different from the Danish which means that the Dutch Christian Democrats traditionally have enjoyed the advantages enjoyed by the Social Democrats in Denmark (and Sweden, for that matter) and the political cleavages also work in a slightly different way, even if religion probably plays a lesser role than it used to. Still, the ChristenUnie are an interesting addition to the party system which is hard to explain to Scandinavians. Grand coalitions like the one in office in the Netherlands are also unknown in Denmark and Sweden – the last time somebody tried a similar stunt in Denmark was in 1978 and it was a dismal failure.

The causes of the present crisis are not entirely beyond comprehension: The government crisis was triggered by disagreements over the Dutch engagement in Afghanistan and we have seen similar conflicts in Denmark and Sweden over Afghanistan, even if they have not led to major parliamentary impassées. That there are disagreements between the CDA and the PvdA over economic policy – well, the Liberals and the Conservatives don’t always move in the same directions up here.

But the time frame is curious. There is likely to be early elections in the Netherlands – actually, not that early, because the likely date is in … May or June. If this had been Denmark, we would have elections in three or possibly four weeks from now.¹

Similarly, the Dutch spend ages forming governments. Adding another three or four months to the calender before the next full cabinet is up and running would not be an unreasonable guess. In Denmark, we would be looking at two weeks of negotiations if things became really complicated. The last time we had a major cabinet crisis in Denmark was in 1988 and then it took a month – yes, a full month! – to form a government. The normal time frame is about a week of negotiations before the PM presents his new cabinet.

It looks like the Dutch are somewhat annoyed but not really concerned about the prospect of spending much of 2010 without a functioning government. A similar situation would be inconceivable in Denmark and have people fearing that we were close to a national constitutional crisis. Some of the difference has to do with differences in the constitutions (I know too little in detail about the Dutch constitution and electoral low to make any further guesses at the moment), some with differences in political norms.

Which system is the best? I find it hard to say, actually. There have been major upheavals in Dutch politics during the last decade, but over the years Denmark also has had its share of political mess. I suspect that the two countries make almost similar performances when it comes to welfare and the economy as well. But from a Danish point of view, the Dutch are a bit … strange.

1. For all practical purposes, early elections are out of the question in Sweden. The Norwegian constitution does not allow for early elections. [↩]

As we approach the US Independence Day, I thought it could be fun considering which country in Europe that would count as the most “American” – and by the way Denmark seems to be the only country which holds an official popular July 4th celebration (as in: a celebration where the local US Embassy is not the organiser).

US-European relations are notoriously tricky. On the one hand, Americans tend to see Europeans as more cultured and sophisticated while on the other hand deploring their (our) lack of initiative. Europeans see Americans as shallow and materialistic and consequently do everything that is in our power to emulate the US lifestyle with a couple of years’ delay.

OK: Our cars and houses are still smaller, but you get the picture.

But to round up some suspects and criteria: What does it take to be “an American country”?

First, we could be looking for a country which in some way or the other has influenced US culture and social and political institutions in a significant way. Britain (legal system) and France (rationalism, republicanism) would be obvious suspects, but perhaps the Netherlands also merit some attention.

Second, we could look for countries where American social, economic and political influence has been especially profound. The Federal Republic of Germany with its emphasis on federalism and the role played by the Bundesverfassungsgericht would be an obvious candidate here.

Third, we could look for countries which institutional similarities even if there is no evidence of direct US influence. Switzerland with its profoundly federal style of government and limited public sector would be a parallel on this side of the Atlantic. But then again, the Swiss are probably too organised and exclusive for the American taste.

But, just to tease you, I will promise two more posts on the subject with some surprising candidates. Stay tooned.

Denmark makes it to foreign media. But for all the wrong reasons.

Food for thought: Imagine how the world would react if the Germans tried the same. But ok: Italian fascism was all fun and games.

If you have an accident in Denmark after surgeries’ closing time, don’t bother calling the emergency doctor. Just get the undertaker.

What politics in Denmark is really about these days: Children’s lunches in daycare centres.

Rasmussen, Rasmussen, Rasmussen – haven’t those Danes got any sense of imagination?

So you thought diplomacy was about keeping quiet? Sweden has had a blogging FM since 2006 and now the Dutch FM has taken up twittering.

HT: Mark Wubben who is also ecstatic about Mr. Verhagen’s weapon phone of choice.

So, the ungrateful Paddys Irish voters did it again: Voted to no a European treaty.

With a turn-out of 53,1%, 46,6% voted yes to the Treaty of Lisbon while 53,4% voted no. (Official data here)

The problem now is a) Why did the Irish vote against the treaty and b) What does this mean for Ireland and the EU?

With regard to question a) the immediate answer is likely to be that the voters voted on something else than the issue – political scientists have a term for this: the second-order election problem -, but there is a couple of problems here:

a1) This isn’t the first time the Irish have stopped (at least momentarily) an EU treaty. It happened in 2001 and even if the turn-out was a pathetic 34,8%, the politicians should have learnt their lesson by now.

a2) This isn’t the first time, the present treaty has hit a serious bump in the road: I’ll leave aside the legal niceties and note that the French rejected the treaty in its original form in 2005 (Y: 45,3%, N: 54,7, T-O: 69,3%) as did the Dutch a couple of days later (Y: 38,5%, N: 61,5%, T-O: 63,3%). This treaty systematically fails at referendums.

It will be interesting to see a breakdown of the numbers, but generally there seems to be some clear dimensions in the voting in all three countries: Class and urban-rural divisions play a role here¹ – the urban middle-classes are pro-Europe, the working-class and people from rural areas are more likely to be Euro-sceptic.²

b) is trickier and political scientists in general are bad oracles but I’ll try some observations:

b1) The obvious strategy will be to make this “the Irish problem” in order to contain the damage in the short run. I’m not sure that this is the best road to take in the long run as there are misgivings about the EU out there.

b2) Ireland and to a certain degree Denmark has provisions for mandatory referendums, while there is a strong push for a UK referendum on Europe by anti-EU groups. This could stop formal institutional development and push the cooperation into transnational policy-networks that are more flexible but also more difficult to control.

b3) Denmark has a couple of issues on the agenda – the Maastricht opt-outs and the future of Anders Fogh Rasmussen. I’m sure that it would be possible to hold referendums on the opt-outs under the present Nice Treaty but it may look odd politically. On the other hand, it might theoretically be easier to keep the referendums as referendums on Justice and Home Affairs and Foreign and Defence Policy. My guess is that we will be a bit wiser in early July or August.

Declaration of interest: In case anybody out there wonder, I’ve voted in the Danish referendums in 1986, 1992, 1993 and 1998 as well as the Swedish referendum in 2003. I voted yes all of the times even if I had and have some reservations about the economic conception behind the ECB’s brief.

Update: Professor Richard Sinnott, author of a standard volume on Irish electoral behaviour, has this analysis in the Irish Times. He points to two factors affecting the vote: a) a lack of confidence in people regarding their knowledge of the issues and b) national identity.

How would this

… it is evident that running an integrationist referendum in a political culture in which almost two-thirds of the electorate feel themselves to belong exclusively to a certain national identity (in this case Irish) is never going to be a walkover.

apply in the Danish case?

1. One of my correspondents pointed to the fishing industry as a particular problem [↩]
2. the term is not used in the British sense where Euro-skeptic is a euphemism for anti-European [↩]

For those in a hurry: Here are my del.icio.us-bookmarks tagged referendums – you’ll find links to references about the Irish referendums (including to no to the original Treaty of Nice) as well as the Dutch and French referendums of 2005.

A Fistful of Euros have a discussion thread as does European Tribune.

Alex Harrowell brings us what must surely be the headline of the day, nay, of the week.

Oh, and I have Mads Brügger’s interview with Geert Wilders from last week waiting for me on the AppleTV.

No, it’s not a joke.

The Dutch newspaper De Pers has conducted a poll about which kinds of people would be acceptable as prime ministers to the Dutch.

When asked, 93% thought a woman could be PM, 78% were ok with a homosexual while 75% could accept a PM with an African background (the actual wording is zwart, which strictly speaking means black and probably means “someone from the former Dutch colonies” in this context).

You could of cause turn the perspective and argue that 22% would not accept a homosexual and 25% not an African.

Religion turned out to be more contentious. Only 53% would accept a Jew as PM in the country of Anne Frank against 33% accepting a hard-line Christian and 27% a Muslim.

If John McCain was Dutch, he needn’t make the effort. Only 19% would accept someone older than 70 as PM.

Of cause the question, “could a heterosexual man be Prime Minister of the Netherlands?” was not asked. And Queen Beatrix just turned 70 some days ago.