Jacob Christensen

This time a post by Kevin O’Rouke on voxEU:

A glance at the electoral map suffices to confirm what earlier opinion polls had indicated: the Irish vote divided along class lines in a stark and disturbing fashion. In the most affluent constituencies of Dublin, such as Dun Laoghaire, where even a modest home can cost upwards of €1 million (although that is changing), 60% or more voted for the treaty. In working class areas of the city, it was the no vote which scored in excess of 60%. Brouard and Tiberj (2006) show that precisely the same division between rich and poor, or the skilled and unskilled, can be discerned in the French 2005 vote.

There are at least two ways of interpreting such [voting] patterns. The first would hold that well educated voters are more politically sophisticated and better able to understand the issues involved in a complex amendment to the institutional underpinnings of the European Union. The second interpretation is that, on the contrary, both rich and poor are capable of correctly discerning where their economic interests lie, and vote accordingly. The argument would be that globalisation generally, and European integration more narrowly, has overwhelmingly favoured skilled workers, at least in affluent countries such as France, Ireland and the Netherlands. Unskilled workers, by contrast, feel under threat from Romanian (or Asian) competition, or immigration from Eastern Europe and further afield. And while those of us who are more fortunate might regret it, it is hardly surprising that — in accordance with Heckscher-Ohlin logic — they vote accordingly.

As they say: Read the whole thing.

I decided to take a look at the latest Eurobarometer (autumn 2007) to see how the Irish place themselves with regard to the EU and European institutions. To make a very long story short, the Irish do not appear to be particularly Euro-skeptic, at least not in the British meaning of the term. See for instance this map:

Note the difference between Ireland and the UK!

The Irish also have higher trust for the EU than national political institutions:

However, when asked about political efficacy, the Irish tend to think that their voice is not heard in the EU:

So, the ungrateful Paddys Irish voters did it again: Voted to no a European treaty.

With a turn-out of 53,1%, 46,6% voted yes to the Treaty of Lisbon while 53,4% voted no. (Official data here)

The problem now is a) Why did the Irish vote against the treaty and b) What does this mean for Ireland and the EU?

With regard to question a) the immediate answer is likely to be that the voters voted on something else than the issue – political scientists have a term for this: the second-order election problem -, but there is a couple of problems here:

a1) This isn’t the first time the Irish have stopped (at least momentarily) an EU treaty. It happened in 2001 and even if the turn-out was a pathetic 34,8%, the politicians should have learnt their lesson by now.

a2) This isn’t the first time, the present treaty has hit a serious bump in the road: I’ll leave aside the legal niceties and note that the French rejected the treaty in its original form in 2005 (Y: 45,3%, N: 54,7, T-O: 69,3%) as did the Dutch a couple of days later (Y: 38,5%, N: 61,5%, T-O: 63,3%). This treaty systematically fails at referendums.

It will be interesting to see a breakdown of the numbers, but generally there seems to be some clear dimensions in the voting in all three countries: Class and urban-rural divisions play a role here¹ – the urban middle-classes are pro-Europe, the working-class and people from rural areas are more likely to be Euro-sceptic.²

b) is trickier and political scientists in general are bad oracles but I’ll try some observations:

b1) The obvious strategy will be to make this “the Irish problem” in order to contain the damage in the short run. I’m not sure that this is the best road to take in the long run as there are misgivings about the EU out there.

b2) Ireland and to a certain degree Denmark has provisions for mandatory referendums, while there is a strong push for a UK referendum on Europe by anti-EU groups. This could stop formal institutional development and push the cooperation into transnational policy-networks that are more flexible but also more difficult to control.

b3) Denmark has a couple of issues on the agenda – the Maastricht opt-outs and the future of Anders Fogh Rasmussen. I’m sure that it would be possible to hold referendums on the opt-outs under the present Nice Treaty but it may look odd politically. On the other hand, it might theoretically be easier to keep the referendums as referendums on Justice and Home Affairs and Foreign and Defence Policy. My guess is that we will be a bit wiser in early July or August.

Declaration of interest: In case anybody out there wonder, I’ve voted in the Danish referendums in 1986, 1992, 1993 and 1998 as well as the Swedish referendum in 2003. I voted yes all of the times even if I had and have some reservations about the economic conception behind the ECB’s brief.

Update: Professor Richard Sinnott, author of a standard volume on Irish electoral behaviour, has this analysis in the Irish Times. He points to two factors affecting the vote: a) a lack of confidence in people regarding their knowledge of the issues and b) national identity.

How would this

… it is evident that running an integrationist referendum in a political culture in which almost two-thirds of the electorate feel themselves to belong exclusively to a certain national identity (in this case Irish) is never going to be a walkover.

apply in the Danish case?

1. One of my correspondents pointed to the fishing industry as a particular problem [↩]
2. the term is not used in the British sense where Euro-skeptic is a euphemism for anti-European [↩]

For those in a hurry: Here are my del.icio.us-bookmarks tagged referendums – you’ll find links to references about the Irish referendums (including to no to the original Treaty of Nice) as well as the Dutch and French referendums of 2005.

A Fistful of Euros have a discussion thread as does European Tribune.

If these early results stand, boy what a mess the EU has on its hands. If they don’t, well, that will teach us something about the regional distribution of votes in Ireland.

“Níl” is Gaelic for “No”

Henry Farrell has been busy and provides us with two posts about the Irish referendum on Thursday. The Crooked Timber piece is more or less a summary of the campaign (which in many ways appears to have been pretty unfocused on both sides) while the Monkey Cage post discusses Andrew Moravcik’s understanding of the need (or lack thereof) for legitimising the EU. (HF is sceptical of AM, in case you are curious).

I’ll just steal this from the Monkey Cage post and ask if this would also apply to Denmark (remember that if the Lisbon Treaty passes the Irish referendum, then we are looking at one or more referendums in Denmark in the near future) and Sweden:

Given the difficulties encountered by both the pro-EU argument for legitimation through more democracy, and Moravcsik’s more limited functionalist approach, is there any alternative? My first approximation argument is that there is. As Moravcsik says, there are relatively few salient fundamental cleavages in politics, and European integration isn’t one of them. Thus, the inherent disorganization of the debate in referendums, where you get one side composed of European elites convinced that Europe is a matter of obligation and destiny, the other side a discordant clatter of contrary viewpoints, and voters not quite sure what to do with either set of claims.

The alternative is to recast European policies in the light of traditional cleavages, the most obvious one being the cleavage between left and right. Europe has, to date, been the matter of consensus between center left and center right. But there are very different ways in which politics might be organized on the European level, depending on your attachment to the traditional models of left and right. The left has traditionally favoured a variety of national institutions designed to protect individuals against the vagaries of markets, the right (with some variations) has been more attached in recent decades to free market policies. European policies have clear implications for the feasibility of both, depending on which specific policies are chosen.

Is it a fluke or will the next week be really exciting?

The poll shows the number of people intending to vote No has almost doubled to 35 per cent (up 17 points) since the last poll three weeks ago, while the number of the Yes side has declined to 30 per cent (down 5 points).

The number of undecided voters is still a significant 28 per (down 12 points) cent, while 7 per cent won’t vote.

The massive increase by the No vote since the last poll has mainly come through gains among undecided voters but, even more ominously for the Yes side, it has lost some support to the No camp.

While the final outcome is still in the hands of undecided voters, the clear momentum is now with the No campaign, and it will take a dramatic shift in public attitudes over the next few days for the Yes side to win.

The swing to the No camp has not been prompted by domestic considerations, with just 5 per cent of those opposed to the Treaty saying they are influenced by a desire to protest against the Government.

The reason most often cited by No voters is that they don’t know what they are voting for or they don’t understand the Treaty, with 30 per cent of No voters listing this as the main reason for their decision.

At the third and final reading, the Danish parliament ratifies the Lisbon Treaty with 90 votes to 25. The Danish People’s Party and the Red-Green Alliance voted against the treaty, the Socialist Party split 11-3 while all other parties supported the treaty.

Politiken notes the media silence.

One observation about the decision not to hold a referendum about the Lisbon EU Treaty: Danish media have had a lot of coverage about the “strategic” effects of the decision both before and after it was formally announced (would Danish voters be more or less likely to vote yes or no in coming referendums about the Edinburgh opt-outs? Will Anders Fogh Rasmussen get a post in the EU?) but the only attempt at something remotely like a substantive judicial analysis I have been able to find, is Hjalte Rasmussen’s essay in Berlingske Tidende, even if that also is mostly about how the treaty has been put together in order to avoid a (Danish) referendum.

So what we have with regard to the legal substance is a responsum by the Justice Ministry in a very formal legal language and not that much else.

Why did Brad deLong have to be dragged into this? Because he asked for it!

The Centre for European Reform briefs us. A great conversation piece for your next date. (Hat tip: Utrikesbloggen)

If you’re curious – and read Scandinavian – here is the Danish PM’s unofficial official position. (Danish politicians are still trying to find a stance on whether or not to hold a referendum on the thing).

Finally, Philip Lane of Trinity College discusses the reform treaty from an Irish perspective on VoxEU. Ireland is interesting as the country has to hold a referendum on the treaty.