Jacob Christensen

Over the years, I have voted on the European Monetary Union twice – or even three times, depending on how you count: The 1992 Maastricht referendum in Denmark, the 2003 EMU referendum in Sweden – and technically speaking the 1993 Danish referendum on the Edinburgh agreement also included the issue of Denmark’s relation to the future monetary union. Among us, I will admit to having voted “yes” both (all three) times even if I had become more critical of the project over the years.

The EMU raises a number of political and economic issues. Basically, there were two arguments for the monetary union: First, it should facilitate trade in the EU; second, it should help create a common identity. The question here is if the EMU and the single currency were and are necessary conditions for reaching either goal – even if we should also be critical of developments on the financial markets, they have come up with a number of instruments designed to lower the costs of currency fluctuations during the past thirty years and as for bank notes as a means of creating identity, well, yes and no. The Deutschmark-nationalism is a well-known fact.

Back in the early 1990s, I found the technicalities of the entire adventure hard to grasp even if I actually attended a lecture where Niels Thygesen explained the process and the institutional set-up. Maybe I was theoretically challenged, maybe Thygesen wasn’t a master of didactics or maybe there was some kind of flaw in the political set-up. Still, all things considered I thought the Maastricht package was better than letting what was then the EC go sideways.

In 2003, I had some more specific issues with the EMU. In 2000 the Danish Economic Council had more or less destroyed the basis of the “yes”-campaign by pointing out that joining the EMU had no economic benefits for Denmark – an important part of the reason was that the Danish currency had been pegged to the D-Mark and later the proto-Euro since 1982 – and that membership was a purely political question. We would have expected Danish politicians to receive this conclusion enthusiastically but the problem is that Danish EU-politics in general has relied on de-politicising issues related to Europe. Similarly, monetary policy has been depoliticised in most Western countries since the 1980s by handing over competences to the national reserve banks.

The situation in Sweden was – and is – slightly different, as the Swedish currency has been floating since the mid-1990s so technically Sweden has some degrees of freedom with regard to monetary policy which Denmark do not have.

In any case voters are a curious bunch: They do not like “politics” but on the other hand they do not like the idea of not having any actual influence on central political issues – such as economic growth and employment.

And this was one major problem with the EMU: It is copied on the (West-)German post-war tradition of fiscal and monetary policy which basically states that employment and economic growth are subordinate to price stability, so if you adopt the EMU, you also make a political choice which not everybody would agree in.

Another problem is that EMU assumes that economic development in all member countries follows the same economic cycle. This raises the question what happens when some countries are going through an economic slump while others are in a boom. The EMU does not have the instruments to deal with this situation, except banning countries with weak growth from boosting their economies. There are more problems, but this will illustrate the political-economic-institutional corner the EMU countries risked painting themselves into.

Finally there was the question about governance in the EMU. Having guidelines is all very well, but problems arise when they are not followed. A more thorough examination of Greece’s political and economic institutions would probably have kept the country out of the EMU to the benefit of both Greece and the EMU. Similarly, France and Germany forced the EMU to bend its rules with regard to deficits and debt in the early 2000s.

Add a major global economic slump and the EMU vehicle is very likely to hit the wall in a violent matter. We are now in a situation where four or five EMU countries are facing a choice between a decade of severe austerity and slow (if any) growth on the one hand or leaving the EMU suffering the penalties of the financial markets. This is a recipe for severe social disorder: 2012 may not be 1932 but politicians and bureaucrats would still do well to remember the name “Heinrich Brüning”, the German chancellor whose technocratic austerity policies led Germany to the brink of civil war.

At the same time, politicians are slowly recognising that the existing political-economic institutions are inadequate and have to be amended. But, first, passing institutional reforms in the multi-level EU system is notoriously tricky, and, second, the process has already revealed the cracks in the relationships between EU countries. It is not outlandish to consider the possibility of the UK leaving the EU or the Eurozone breaking up into two or more parts.

So to conclude: What the EU needs now is not another patchwork agreement (even if the Union has to muddle through in the short and medium term) but a reassessment of the raison d’être of a political and monetary union and the adequacy of its institutions.

Last week’s silence was due to a vacation which I spent visiting Berlin. Among the sights was this probably unintentionally but still highly symbolic bear commemorating a meeting of EU Finance Ministers in 2007.

PS: All my public photos from the trip are here. And here is a batch from the last time I visited Berlin – in 2004.

It is perhaps worth remembering that November 11 is the anniversary of the 1918 armistice which ended World War I. The Horsemen of the Apocalypse which I photographed in Bruges this summer were not displayed as a memorial for the War and the dead but as it was Flanders and as those living at the time may very well have feared that some kind of apocalypse had come, they may still serve of a fitting reminder of a truly terrible war.

Compared to the latest strange twists in the Euro-crisis, Rufus T. Firefly almost comes out as a competent and reliable leader. So, can we find any political logic in all of this?

First, experts tell us that the Euro-zone problems caused by Greece and Italy are different by those caused by Spain, Portugal and Ireland. The economic crises in the latter three countries are basically due to the effects of the EMU creating low rates not only in Germany but in the entire Euro-zone. Low rates mean cheap money and that has meant property bubbles. Once they burst, the economies of Spain, Portugal and Ireland were thrown into a deep recession.

So the question here is if creating a European monetary zone was a good idea if the national economies are not (or cannot be brought) in tune.

Greece and Italy are different creatures altogether. Here the fundamental problem is that the countries lack good economic governance. This is putting it mildly: We could also say that the political economy in both countries rest on clientilism and that neither country has a functioning tax system. There are degrees of Hell here: Greece is probably in a worse state than Italy while the Italian economy for obvious reasons are much larger than the Greek.

So the question here is why the two countries were admitted to the EMU in the first place? Political prestige – both on the side of the EU and the individual countries – has a lot to do with it.

Second, what do you do when you find yourself in quicksand up to the neck? The issue here is that the creation of the EMU and the adoption of the Euro in PolSci lingo is path dependent: Getting in may be difficult and expensive but the costs of leaving may be almost prohibitive both politically and economically. Which goes a long way towards explaining why European leaders face some major problems in finding a solution to the Greek (and Italian) mess.

But wait: It gets worse. Remember that political leaders operate on multiple levels – the European and the national. So long as political leaders can and will deliver on the agreements made on the European level, negotiations are complicated. European leaders know and accept that agreements may be due to national votes (or in some cases referendums) and this is more or less elegantly taken into account at negotiations.

But what happens when a national political leader throws a bomb and announces a referendum after an agreement has been reached? This is changing the rules during the middle of the game and more than likely to make other EU leaders angry, disillusioned or both. There may – theoretically – be a rationale on the national level: Papandreou is effectively facing a vote of no-confidence in parliament and could react by taking his case to the nation.

The problem here is that referendums are usually extra veto points, especially when we are dealing with measures that are unpopular with the electorate (We will leave aside that the Greek economic policy has been unsustainable in the long run: The Greek electorate are not exactly used to having to relate to responsible economic policies). If – as we expect – he loses the referendum, he will be dead politically and the hope of Greece gaining a stronger position at a renegotiation (which I would suspect will motivate a lot of Greek voters) looks rather unrealistic. And even if he wins the referendum, Papandreou is likely to be met with suspicion in Brussels – after all, he was the man who changed the rules of the game during the previous match. How can we be sure that he will not engage in another round of match-fixing the next time?

And in the meantime, time flies and if there is anything the Eurozone does not have then it is time. If Papandreou sticks with his plan, we should expect speculative attacks against the Euro – and to be perfectly honest, I would also expect rounds of shenanigans from the Italian government. All stuff designed to undermine economic stability in the Eurozone.

Very bad news indeed. We may need the Marx Brothers for relief.

Denna bloggpost har skrivits som svar på Det flerspråkiga bloggandets dag, ett initiativ från Europakommissionens kontor i Storbritannien.

Som läsaren sannolikt har bemärkt är detta vanligtvis en blogg skriven av en dansk på engelska. Detta är något motsägelsefullt då jag generellt är rätt så kritisk mot tendensen till att likställa “internationell” med “engelska”, en tendens som har ledd till att så gott som alla andra språk än engelskan håller på att försvinna helt från det danska utbildningssystemet – franskan, tysken, ja även svenskan håller på att gå samma öde som dodon till mötes. När skandinaver träffas nuförtiden, brukar de prata med varandra på engelska även om de nationella språken knappast avviker mer från varandra än dialekterna inom varje land (Om man inte tror mig, försök då att lyssna till en svensk som prata skånska eller en nordman som talar dialekten från trakterna kring Bergen).

Det finns många orsaker till att detta är en olycklig tendens. Jag har i och för sig inga problem med att tala (och skriva) på engelska – förutom den mindre komplikationen som består i att jag förlorar mellan 30 och 50 procent av min uttrycksförmåga och förståelse av vad jag lyssnar på eller läser, ett faktum som i allmänhet fullkomligt överses av de politiker och byråkrater som aktivt understöder bruken av engelska i den högre utbildningen. Domänförlusten inom högre utbildning och forskning är ett allvarligt problem men politisk överskuggas det helt av besattheten av engelskan som Det Internationella Språket. Märkvärdigt nog har det multikulturella Sverige genomfört lagstiftning som skall stödja svenskans och en rad minoritetsspråks status medan politikerna i nationalistiska Danmark antigen är kallsinniga eller i praktiken stöder ersättningen av danskan med engelska.

Men det finns mer att beakta. Språk är inte bara instrumentella. Att lära sig ett annat språk betyder också att man lär sig om kulturen eller kulturerna i det land eller de länder där det används. Om man till exempel inte kan tala eller förstå tyska, finns det ganska mycket om Tyskland man går miste om. Det gäller inte bara Goethe och andra döda gubbar utan också varför ens affärsförbindelser uppträder som de gör. Och varför man råkade trampa i klaveret under det mötet.

Och för övrigt: Jag har aldrig formellt lärt mig att tala eller skriva svenska, men tillbaka i 1970-talet råkade jag se en del svensk tv liksom jag hade flera svenska lärare när jag läste på universitetet. Och sen bodde och arbetade jag förstås hinsidan från 1999 till 2008.

Oh, you want a translation? Here goes:

This blog post was written as a response to the Day of Multilingual Blogging, an initiative from the European Commission Representation in the UK.

As you have probably noted, this is (usually) a blog written by a Dane in English. This is slightly ironic as I am rather sceptical of the trend to equate “international” with “English”, something which has led to almost any other language than English to disappear in the Danish educational system – French, German, even Swedish are going the way of the Dodo. When Scandinavians meet these days, they tend to speak English even though the national languages hardly differ more than the dialects within each country. (If you don’t believe me, try listening to a Swede speaking Skånska or, even better, a Norwegian speaking the dialect from the Bergen area).

There are many reasons why this is a deeply troubling development. I have no problems with speaking (and writing) in English as such – except for the minor issue that I lose some 30-50% of the information that I can convey and understand in my native Danish, a fact which is generally lost on the politicians and bureaucrats who promote the use of English in higher education. Domain loss in higher education and research is a serious issue but it is eclipsed by the obsession with English as The International Language. Curiously, multiethnic Sweden has introduced legislation regulating the status of Swedish (and a number of minority languages) while politicians in nationalist Denmark are complacent or in practice actively support the replacement of Danish with English.

But there is more to consider. Languages are not purely instrumental: Learning to use another language also means learning about the cultures of country/ies where it is spoken. If you can’t read or speak German, there are a lot of things about Germany that you will completely miss. We are not just speaking Goethe and other dead men here, but things like the context of political and social debates. Or for that matter why your business partners behave the way they do. And why you put your foot in your mouth during that meeting.

And by the way: I have never learned to speak, read or write Swedish in any formalised way. I just happened to watch some Swedish tv back in the 1970s just as I had a number of Swedish teachers when I went to university. And then I lived and worked on the other side between 1999 and 2008.

Click.

(Don’t worry: It’s perfectly safe for work. Unless you are a German economist)

So, there is an EU summit coming up? Who’d have thunk – the good thing about these things being held in Brussels is that nobody except the EU correspondents and the Eurocrats have to care. But thanks to Caroline de Cock aka Linotherhino, we too can have a piece of the action.

Yes, it’s the (almost) official European Council Summit Buzzword Bingo – readily available as a PDF for printing. It even has flexicurity!

PS: Just in case you wonder what a buzzword bingo is, here’s Wikipedia to the rescue.

On a slightly more serious note, I would like to point out, that if you want to perform some real comparisons between the US and European countries, you might want to check out the World Values Survey or the work of my former colleague Torbj�rn Bergman.

By the way, judging from this figure on the WVS site, it looks as if Northern Ireland followed by Austria (!) are the European countries that are closest to the US.

I’ll admit: Personally, I’m no supporter of the Danish People’s Party but the initial manoeuvring over the UK Conservative Party’s choice of partners in the European Parliament has something ridiculous over it. The Tories have stated that the Danish People’s Party were out of the question because it was too extreme politically.

So, which positions are not too extreme for the Tories?

We urgently need global chemotherapy against Islam to save civilisation. Fair and balanced. (Belgium)

Marching with local SS veterans? A-OK. (Latvia)

Women should not stand for parliament? Sure. The Tories are a modern party. (Netherlands)

Banning gay-rights demonstrations? No problem. (Poland)

I’m sorry, but the only thing to do about British politics is to shake one’s head in disbelief.

1. Eurobarometer has a poll covering voting intentions, voters’ ranking of issues, etc. Looks like we’re in for a fall in turn-out. HT: Charlemagne, the Europhile .
2. There is a Danish poll out (but don’t tell anyone). Surprise result: The Eurosceptic movements look to lose heavily. Let’s see.

Bonus: The Prime Minister’s speech in the Folketing earlier today. Haven’t had the time to read it yet.