Jacob Christensen

Moving offices is drawing ever closer.

The content of the two “About” pages (About me; About the blog) dates back to 2005 when I started blogging here and at the time I didn’t put too much effort into the descriptions. My internet presence was the side-effect of something else and there really was no need to be too specific about who I was or what I did (or could do). Also, I have another domain – jacobchristensen.eu – which I have never quite figured out what to do with but when registration of .eu-domains was opened, I figured out that I might want it. I was always frustrated by jacobchristensen.dk not being available (Actually, that domain appears not be active) and somehow the idea of splitting content between a “personal” (.name) and a “professional” (.eu) attracted me. At least in theory: The .eu-site has always been a place-holder.

But let us start with jacobchristensen.name as it is.

“About the blog” is the easy bit so I’ll take that first.

Here is what I wrote in 2005 (with some later editing):

This blog contains comments and reviews of Danish and Swedish politics – and on occasion other countries – notes on political science and comments about social or research matters.

The blog has no posting policy as such: Occasionally I’ll post a bunch of entries during one day, occasionally there will be some days between posts, but I try to post whenever something interesting happens in one of the two countries and I have the time to write a comment.

Why Danish and Swedish politics? Because I taught Swedish and comparative politics back then and because I have a professional curiosity about issues and developments in the two countries. Also, the writing would give you an idea of how I approach and analyse social and political issues. I occasionally joke about the blog having an imagined readership of five: This is not just self-deprecating humour, it also reflects why the blog came into being originally. It was – and is – an alternative to e-mail conversations. I don’t really have a political agenda (even if you could probably figure out where I stand from reading a number of posts) and I generally don’t blog about my current work or places of work here. Call it superstition or discretion.

Anyway, as this is a work of interest and not my day-job I think it is ok that I post about issues that interest me (note that art, books and music have also found their way into the blog). I find that while compartmentalising my internet presence has sounded like a good idea in theory (see above regarding .name and .eu), I have never quite been able to carry it out in practice. For better for worse, my Twitter and Facebook streams are a mix of the serious and the hilarious. In some ways, Twitter has made it easier for me to stay on a more serious note here (I see Twitter and to some degree Facebook as virtual coffee machines – a vital part of any Scandinavian office).

Still, what would I write today? How about this:

The blog reflects my professional interest in Danish and Swedish politics and social matters. The aim of posts about these subjects is to deepen my understanding of what is happening in the two countries and invite to discussions with friends and colleagues, not to promote a particular political point of view or to present my work.

I also occasionally post about art, music and books that have caught my attention but as I am not an art (or music or literary) expert, these posts more or less reflect what interests me when I am not working.

Comments – either in the comments form or by mail or on Twitter (write @jacobchr) – are more than welcome! I’ll get back to the “About me” page which also needs a revision in the next couple of days.

Courtesy of fellow tweep Søren Sommerglæde (a suitable name in the dead of winter), I joined an “Artist Walk and Talk” at the local exhibition building Filosoffen – it is located at Filosofgangen, hence the name – where Søren discussed the some of the works with Carsten Rudolfsen and Poul Weile, two members of the association Grünhorse whose works are on display until next weekend. It was a refreshing approach with an interested member of the public rather than an art expert – hope you are not bothered by the description, Søren – as discussant.

The photograph shows the exhibition of no less than 120 small paintings by German artist Runhild Wirth who followed the demolition of the Palast der Republik on site between 2006 and 2008. Just for fun, here are two photographs I took at the same site in November 2004 and November 2011:

First 2004

And then 2011

PS: Look closely, and you will find me on one of the photos from the event here.

Today’s Politiken has an article where a number of new MPs complain about the dominant culture in the Danish parliament. Their basic line of argument is that political debate has degenerated into endless repetitions of obvious questions and arguments and that much political behaviour now verges on (if it hasn’t already crossed) the border of victimising.

It is difficult to gauge the argument without extensive studies of parliamentary debates but the observation merits discussion.

First, one of the MPs (Mette Bock) makes the obvious mistake of confusing a parliament with a business. A business corporation has a limited number of goals (produce goods or services, create a profit) while a parliament as a representative organ is one of the major arena for social conflicts. Of course power struggles are part of most, if not all, organisations, but observers of parliamentary business are well-advised to remember that behind most of the work done in any parliament there are more or less manifest conflicts of interests or values.

Second, this means that politicians in general and parliamentarians in particular face two tasks: Solve problems and mobilise voters and social interests. These tasks are not always easy to handle in isolation. Combine them and things get very complicated. We should also note, that if problem-solving gets the upper hand there is a risk that citizens will feel less engagement and perhaps even feel alienated from the policy elite. If mobilisation gets the upper hand, we end in pointless polemics – and voters may end being disgusted by destructive politics.

On the other hand, voters appreciate constructive politics and – as everyone who has checked the Facebook-pages of politicians and political commentators – polemical and condescending attacks on political opponents will invariably draw hordes of cheering supporters. If this sounds confusing, you are on the trail of something important: Voters’ preferences are contradictory.

If you – like me – have read a large number of political debates, you will be depressingly familiar with the polemical style. This is not limited to one particular wing of the political spectrum, but usually the opposition of the day is the most obnoxious part. To me, the problem is that polemics and “gotcha” questions and statements more often than not fail to bring something new to the process. Most Danish politicians are fascinatingly inept at this.

And personally, I tune out when the familiar type of polemics begin.

I was looking for some data about the Danish Social Democrats for an article. Unfortunately, the internet (and in particular the material posted by the Danish Royal Library) can be a frustrating tool but here are some facts which interested me – not least because a comparison with Sweden could be worth an effort:

1. The Danish party has reformed its central organisation during the 00s: The old party board and executive committee were merged into a new board.

2. The statutes have rules for a direct election of the party chairman

3. Membership has continued its downward trend, despite an increase in 2005-06 following the leadership election. In 2003 the party had 54700 members, in 2010 it was down to 46050. The Social Democrats can take some solace in the fact that the party once again is the largest in terms of members after losing the position to the Liberals some time during the 1990s. In 2003 the Liberals had 69800 members, in 2010 they were down to 44400.

4. LO (the Danish TUC) no longer supports the Social Democrats but the party continues to receive some support from individual unions. Still, public subsidies are the largest sources of income by far.

Just in case you didn’t read the comment, here is Nick’s post which focuses on the organisational level.

And what a ride that was: The Swedish Social Democrats – a party which traditionally embodied the image of rational social engineering – spent the better part of 2011 on a veritable political roller-coaster under the luckless HÃ¥kan Juholt. Crises and internal conflicts are nothing new to the Nordic Social Democracies but a train-wreck of these dimensions is something unprecedented. One would probably have to look at the German Social Democrats where the position as party chairman turned into a veritable catapult sometime during the 1990s with the rapid succession of chairmen in 2005-2006 at the high (or low) point. Still, Germany with its federal structure is different and the party chairman is not necessarily the party’s candidate for the position as federal chancellor.

But at this point it is fair to ask what went wrong and how big the risks that the Social Democrats will repeat their mistakes. To do so, it will be an idea to look at the challenges, routines and solutions facing or available to the Social Democrats at four different levels and how the party responded and used the available alternatives.

The Social Level
There can be no doubt that the Social Democrats are structurally challenged. The party’s historical base was the numerous smaller and mid-sized communities which again formed the basis of industrial development during the 20th century but the Swedish society has changed as the major cities have become the main economic centres and the population is migrating to the Stockholm, Gothenburg, Malmö/Lund and Linköping/Norrköping regions. Crucially, the Social Democrats lost the fight against the Conservatives in Stockholm and SkÃ¥ne in 2006 and again in 2010. Magnus Hagevi discussed this in a recent blog post but I would like to elaborate a bit on his argument by adding the shares of the vote won by the Left Party and the Green Party (I also begin my graph in 1970 rather than 1968)

It is obvious that the Social Democrats are facing a long-term decline in their share of the vote: While the party could operate with a target of 45 percent until the mid-1980s, its target share has been around 40 percent until 2006 and these days 35 percent looks like a more reasonable target. This means I am assuming that the party was performing below its potential in 2010 – and this assumption may not necessarily be correct. But another point is that “the left” is not necessarily weaker because of the Social Democratic crisis – the Left Party and the Green Party could attract voters, even if the Sweden Democrats continue to pull working-class voters to the right; a development Andreas Johansson Heinö has hightlighted (and which has parallels in Denmark)

The Institutional Level
Some years ago, the political scientist Ellen Immergut pointed to an overlooked factor which helped the Social Democrats to maintain their political hegemony from the 1930s until the 1970: The Swedish constitutions. Curiously, the democratisation of the constitution in the form of the abolition of the indirectly elected First Chamber and changes to the electoral system. Immergut’s conclusion is that – depending on your point of view – the Social Democrats punched above their weight until 1970 or that the party would have been stronger on the parliamentary arena, had the two-chamber system been retained.

We should note that the Danish Social Democracy faced similar challenges on the electoral and parliamentary level in the 1970s, so a different institutional development wouldn’t have stopped the Social Democrats from sliding into a crisis but we could have seen a different trajectory.

The Organisational Level
The Swedish Social Democrats have always taken pride in having a strong organisational culture. Outsiders might question the conflict between the image of a grass-roots movement on the one hand and the reality of a top-down controlled machine on the other but the party for a long time succeeded in creating the impression of an organisation without visible conflicts.

The problem is that a strong organisational culture which punish deviating opinions and open conflicts is bound to run into trouble when the environment changes or when conflicts emerge. In reality, there are only two ways to deal with this situation: Either let a dominant leadership decide the course and accept that dissidents are either excluded or leave or find some way of making conflict and conflict-resolution legitimate. The Social Democrats did neither following the Göran Persson’s resignation and this effectively meant that the party was drifting, despite the good intentions of Mona Sahlin. The closed nature of the process behind the selection of first Mona Sahlin and later HÃ¥kan Juholt only served to disguise the cracks in the walls of the building.

The Individual Level
At some point during the autumn of 2011 it was obvious that Håkan Juholt wasn’t the man to lead the Social Democrats out of their misery, but what was wrong? As the Swedish magazine Fokus has pointed out, Juholt’s first problem was that he represented the countryside and small towns, rather than the Stockholm centre. He was an outsider – not just because he hadn’t been a minister – and to succeed, he would need to create a stable power base in the party’s central organs. It was not necessarily wrong to pick an outsider, but the Social Democrats managed to pick a leader who looked more like a throwback to the Sweden of the 1970s than somebody who could finally bring the party into the 21st century.

Juholt’s second problem was that he lacked the basic skills needed in a party leader and especially one whose task would be to bring about major political and organisational change. Commentators have noted his carelessness with facts and controversial private life but to me, Juholt is fascinatingly like a Danish party leader who enjoyed great success in his first five years in office despite a certain erratic element. Yes, I am talking about Villy Søvndal – the traditionalist who transformed SF into a lean and mean electoral and parliamentary machine and who between 2005 and 2010 couldn’t make serious mistakes (What has happened from 2010 onward is a different story). Søvndal’s advantage was in seizing the moment when SF was ripe for organisational reform and creating a team (Ole Sohn in the Folketing and Thor Möger Petersen and – until his early death – Jakob Nørhøj in the party organisation) which could support him in a competent way. Juholt essentially was an agitator – and by all accounts a good one – but lacked the strategic and organisational skills. His team turned out to be just as erratic as the chairman, something which put the final nails in the coffin of Juholt’s leadership.

Postscript: For a number of bad reasons it has taken me ages to finish this post. in the meantime, the Social Democrats’ Executive Committee (which is no longer deferentially referred to as “the powerful Executive Committee”) has installed the leader of the Metal Workers’ Union Stefan Löfven as new/interim/whatever party leader. Lövfen is not an MP, something which highlights the party’s problems with attracting talent at the top levels.

This, I am told, is not a parody but the real thing. Why on Earth support for Paavo Lipponen is languishing at below 10 percent in opinion polls beats me.

Well, not really.

Cudos to Ida Auken, MP for SF and Environment Minister in the three-party government, for drawing our attention to the State Council, one part of the Danish government which most people would be absolutely clueless about if you asked them in a vox-pop but still consider an essential part of the very special Danish form of democracy. Needless to say, the Danish People’s Party went ballistic and the Liberals and the Conservatives argued that any discussion of the Danish constitution amounted to sacrilege and an attack on everything the Sacred Danish Culture is built on.

If the three parties had their way, the minister would surely be banished to some remote island, just like others who dared to question the role of the monarch in the Danish political system.

Anyway, and on a serious note, we are dealing with the relationship between what Walter Bagehot called the dignified and the efficient components of the constitution with the State Council being one of the dignified components with no efficient political role: The Danish Monarch, unlike the German president, does not have an effective right or duty to perform a judicial review of new laws. Still, the Council and its duties are described in the Danish constitution and given that changing the constitution is almost impossible, we will all have to live with the illusion that the Monarch and the State Council have a political role. That Danish media do not report about the meetings and that the Monarch have more efficient, if technically informal, ways of being informed about current events in Danish politics is another matter.

These days, Danish political culture is mainly about creating and maintaining the illusion that we live in the 19th century – or rather: An imagined 19th century in which the sovereign powers of the Monarch were never challenged and Denmark never suffered military defeat.

Given the way the legislative machine works, there is very little which can be done to minimize the role of the State Council: Every ministry churns out new laws every month in numbers that are now too big to count which again means that ministers have to be present to do their presentations. Perhaps it would be possible to assign duties on a rotating basis and avoid meetings that are only designed to ramp up the numbers.

I managed to run my head against things (or have my head run against things) both literally and figuratively. At least the physical wounds were superficial (but unpleasant)