Jacob Christensen

Given that gender equality is … how shall I put it … not exactly at the top of the agenda for the Swedish Conservatives – still a Man’s Party if ever there was one – it is slightly surprising to read that the Finance Minister Anders Borg declares himself a feminist in an interview with Svenska Dagbladet. (See also this piece in Expressen from the spring of 2006).

It is less surprising to read that it was having children which made Borg contemplate the issue. Most women realise the same when they assess the impact having children has on their working life.

One topic for discussion could be: Is it possible to combine the concept of structural discrimination with a neo-liberal conception of social justice? (I’m not too fond of the term neo-liberal which is far too often used indiscriminately, but I hope you get my point)

First, she was with the Left Socialists. Then just leftist-ish. Then, she joined the Social Democrats. Now, Karen Jespersen has left the Social Democrats quoting irreconcilable differences with regard to immigration policies.

The question is: Will Jespersen – and her husband Ralf Pittelkow – be joining the Danish People’s Party any time soon? Her departure from the Social Democrats was made public the same day Pittelkow dismissed the centre-left’s chances of winning the next election

Update: The Social Democratic party secretary Henrik Dam Kristensen has said that Jespersen actually left the party in October and adds caustically:

She probably didn’t feel that she got enough media exposure back then.

Politicians in love. Kristensen also notes the possibility of Jespersen joining the Danish People’s Party, by the way.

Before Christmas, I received this question from one of the blog’s readers:

Why do you think the Scandinavian economic left have stayed Socialist more than anywhere else? Is there something different in their history or culture?

(I should perhaps note that the anywhere else being referred to is the U.K. and Israel)

Phew! That was a difficult one and, as my reader notes, a question one could easily write a Ph.D.-tesis about.

A first question could be: How Socialist are the Scandinavian Social Democratic parties really? Just to state my point – I remember that back in 1981 when Fran�ois Mitterand won the presidential elections in France, Danish commentators noted that Mitterand was a Socialist, not a Social Democrat. We should expect him to be more to the left than the Scandinavian Social Democrats and so his policies were, at least for the first one-and-a-half years before reality hit the Socialist dream.

The same applies when you compare the Scandinavian Social Democrats with Labour in the U.K. The Clause Four issue had for all practical purposes been laid to rest shortly after World War 2. Whatever the rhetoric, post-war Social Democracy has worked within the boundaries of contemporary capitalism even if the blue-collar trade unions during the 1970s pressed for public control of national industries. The liberalisation of capital markets in the 1980s put the final nail in that coffin.

Equally, Scandinavian governments, be they Social Democratic or Conservative, have as a rule adopted the policies of the New Public Management school of thought from the 1980s onward. There is some disagreement with regard to the provision of care services, but when I’m in a cynical mood I argue that the Social Democratic stance on the subject has more to do with symbolic politics and catering for public employees as a voter group than any kind of principled standpoint.

This leaves us with two important policy areas: Labour market policies and the size of the public sector.

Labour market policies is a tricky issue because there are important differences between Danish and Swedish policies. In general, Denmark has had more flexible regulations than Sweden while Sweden traditionally had a more active labour market policy than Denmark. Economists and policial scientists will argue that you need a relatively high degree of organisation in the economy (on both sides of the table) for these policies to work – education and especially training are essential factors for a high-wage economy to be competitive.

Why is this so? The question is difficult to answer. Scandinavian economies have always depended on international trade so globalisation is more a phenomenon of the late 19th Century than of the early 21st. At the same time, the Germanic tradition of craftmanship has been important in the labour movement. You’ll note that U.K. trade unions have always been much more confrontational in their relations with employers while U.S. trade unions have tried to create “Socialism in one company” rather than more general agreements. National policies have played a role here, the historians tell us. (I’m not sure if Theda Skocpol will accept being labeled a historian, but never mind).

The question to be considered is: Will this relatively cooperative type of labour market relations survive the transition from an industrial to a service economy in the longer term?

How about the size of the public sector and general welfare policies, then? Here things get a bit complicated because on the one hand it can be argued that the foundations of the general welfare state were in fact laid at the end of the 19th Century while the public sectors and social expenditure in the Scandinavian countries were below the average in Western Europe until the mid-1960s. Very strange indeed.

Whole theses have been written about these subjects so I’ll just note that when the Danes introduced modern social insurance systems in the 1890s, they deliberately chose an organisation that built on income, not labour market status. In this way people with low incomes gained access to old age pensions and health care even if they were not blue-collar workers. At the same time, the link between contributions and benefits was almost non-existing. The Danes even experimented with unemployment insurance for the self-employed during the 1910s. Until 1940s, the Swedes more or less followed the Danish lead, and the idea that income, not status, should be the determining factor has remained an integral part of Scandinavian social policies.

Why did the idea of general eligibility succeed in Scandinavia?

Some say the religion played a role – the idea that you could have benefits without performance has a curious similarity to the Protestant Sola gratia idea of salvation. Others have suggested that the Scandinavian states already had an effective network of local administrative bodies – which in its turn was caused by the existence of a state church.

And maybe the late 19th Century wasn’t the right moment to adopt German policies – after all, Prussia almost wiped Denmark off the map in the 1864 war. Path dependencies took care of the rest.

Going back to the 19th Century (or even the 16th Century) in order to explain the state of affairs in the 21st may seem a bit odd, but the point is that the Social Democratic parties have acted and still act within social and political structures which are pretty unique in the world.

Oh, and one thing more: The Scandinavian states are unitary states (unlike the U.S.), up until the late 20th Century they have been ethnically homogeneous (the U.K. had Ireland and the Celtic fringe to consider) and religion has never played a role as a major, independent cleavage in politics (unlike Germany – or Israel).

Update: I’ve added the missing paragraphs. The post should make sense now.